

## Description of the Action (T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-21-01)

EU Support to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  
'Regional Stabilisation Facility for Lake Chad' (RSF)

February 2020



*Photo credit: UNDP Nigeria/Eno Jonathan*

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# 1. Regional Context

## 1.1 Situation Overview

July 2019 marked the 10<sup>th</sup> year anniversary of the extra-judicial killing of Mohamed Yusuf in police custody in Borno State (Nigeria), and the advent of a decade-long insurgency led by one of the deadliest terrorist groups still active today, Boko Haram. Since 2015, a more muscular response from the national Governments, combined with coordinated military action through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), has been largely successful in degrading Boko Haram's capacity to maintain control of territory in which it operates. Although the last year has seen a marked deterioration in the security environment again.

By March 2018, two main insurgent factions were still active, and continued to wage an insurgency campaign against the government: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), an armed opposition group (AOG), labelled by the media and commonly referred to as "Boko Haram", operating mainly out of southern Borno State; Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which split from Boko Haram in 2016, and which is based close to Lake Chad itself and along Nigeria's northern border with Niger.

Since 2016, ISWAP has differentiated itself from JAS through the development of strategy and tactics that mark it as potentially a more sophisticated and a more challenging opponent. Unlike JAS, ISWAP seeks to avoid unnecessary violence and exploitation against civilian populations, and has introduced a level of governance, including administration of justice, control of commodities and provision of social welfare. A recent GICS report identifies the main success of ISWAP as its ability to effectively appeal to and co-opt local networks, while blending a globalist caliphate messaging with local grievances, competently using it to establish legitimacy in the eyes of local communities<sup>1</sup>.

ISWAP launched a major offensive in January 2019 that has resulted in the overrunning of a number of military bases in Nigeria, large-scale displacement of local populations and a consolidation of territory under ISWAP's nominal control where the Nigerian government and military are not present. In addition, it is likely that the attacks have increased insurgent capability still further, given the loss of military weapons, ammunition, vehicles and other equipment.

Renewed attacks are not limited to Nigeria: in March 2019, separate attacks killed eight civilians at Kiridi in south-eastern Niger in the Diffa region bordering Lake Chad, and left 23 dead at Dangdala, on the north-eastern shore of the Lake, the deadliest attack in Chad to date. Thirty-seven soldiers and civilians were killed in an attack in Darak, Far North region of Cameroon on 10<sup>th</sup> June.

Changes in ISWAP tactics, growing concerns of coordination between the ISWAP and JAS factions, and external support from the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, and the increasing number of violent incidents since the last quarter of 2018, are raising fears that the security situation is once again deteriorating, and that urgent action is required to prevent a significant resurgence of the crisis.

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this document, JAS, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and other armed groups that oppose the Government of Nigeria through violent means will be referred to as "Armed Opposition Groups" (AOGs).

<sup>2</sup> *Survival and Expansion: the Islamic State's West Africa Province*, Global Initiative for Civil Stabilisation, April 2019.

## 1.2 Conflict Impact and Challenges

It is unlikely that security responses alone, however, will be sufficient to address the complex factors that gave rise to the insurgency, and which continue to sustain it. These include a structural and persistent development deficit, with development indicators far below national averages in all of the four countries. Many communities never had schools, health clinics or water supply infrastructure or other services. The long-term failure of governance and absence of the formal State is increasingly compounded by a perceived failure of traditional leaders to stand by their communities and accusations of their collusion in aspects of war economy.

For most in the region, military forces have been the primary interface between local communities and the State over the past decade. While in some areas the military remains highly regarded, in other areas operations have been characterized by a heavy-handed approach and serious violations of human rights. A culture of impunity and lack of accountability mechanisms continues to undermine national counter-insurgency efforts and inhibits international responses in support.

Economic and mobility restrictions imposed by the military, designed to block revenue flow to armed opposition groups, have in practice led to severe restrictions in freedom of movement, affecting a great deal of economic activity, including, *inter alia*, the use of motor taxis, the trade in certain types of food and fuel, access to land for farmers and pastoralists, and market activities in more remote villages and towns. Commerce-related infrastructure has been deliberately targeted by armed opposition groups, and the closure of borders for security purposes has further constrained local economies and livelihoods while driving up the cost of basic commodities. Humanitarian aid has developed as a new domain of economic activity, creating new challenges of dependence, unpredictability and local 'war economies' that are becoming entrenched as the 'new normal'.

Displacement and demographic change exacerbate all these challenges. Limited public services are concentrated in urban areas, and – in line with global experience – many of those displaced from rural communities are unlikely to want to return. Lack of voice and agency of youth contributes to their perceived and real social marginalization. It seems likely that globalization processes, the spread of mobile phones and mobile internet connectivity, have played a role in transforming a mix of grievances about governance shortfall, corruption, political and social marginalization and exclusion of certain groups, into a recruitment platform for violent extremism and armed opposition.

The Lake Chad Basin has historically had a poor record of women's empowerment including low school enrolment, preponderance of early marriages for girls and poor participation of women in public life. The region's deep-rooted patriarchal norms, often codified in law and reinforced by socio-cultural institutions, have defined women's status through marriage and childbearing and confined them to gender roles that do not go beyond the domestic sphere.

The conflict has further exacerbated these discriminatory practices and increased insecurity for women and girls who have been victims of violence and abuse from formal and informal security providers as well as armed opposition groups. Sexual and gender-based violence is endemic across the conflict-affected regions. Harassment of women and girls has been reported in both IDP Camps and host communities, often in the course of conducting daily domestic chores such as fetching water or firewood or whilst using latrines and showers. With rampant hunger and malnutrition, displaced women are often forced to resort to negative coping mechanisms including survival/transactional sex to provide income for their families.

Rebuilding the social contract and regaining the trust of the population is a challenge that requires visible government effort, sustained community engagement, and improved accountability and transparency of security providers. While root causes of the conflict are many and varied, priority must be given to re-establishing the presence as well as the authority of the State: a 'peace dividend' of essential infrastructure and basic services, facilitation of access to livelihoods and the establishment of conditions for private sector development and job creation. The key focus must be on providing tangible benefits for communities 'at risk', and for women and girls in particular.

### 1.3 Regional Responses

A specific layer of complexity for the Lake Chad region is that it straddles four countries, two regional economic communities, two countries that are landlocked and two countries that invest more in the development of their coastal regions than their Sahelian interior<sup>3</sup>.

Aside from national efforts, all four Lake Chad countries, along with the Republic of Benin, have increased their military cooperation under the auspices of the AU-mandated Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF, whose mandate was expanded in 2015 to more effectively combat the insurgency in and around Lake Chad, has been a critical force in enhancing the security response to the crisis, particularly with regard to strengthening cross-border collaboration between the countries.

Produced under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, with the support of the African Union and UNDP, the LCBC *Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin* was approved by the Member States of LCBC on 30th August 2018 and endorsed by the AU Peace & Security Council on 5th December 2018. The Strategy is intended to fulfil the second phase of the MNJTF mandate, as highlighted in the Strategic Concept of Operations of the Force, namely to *"facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes by the LCBC Member States and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs and refugees"*.

The LCBC-AU Regional Stabilisation Strategy for Lake Chad seeks to establish a common approach and an inclusive framework for all stakeholders to support a timely, coordinated, and effective transition from stabilization to medium and longer-term recovery, peacebuilding and development processes. Security and Human Rights comprises Pillar 2 of the Strategy.

The Strategy recognises that the crisis around Lake Chad *"... offers both opportunity and obligation to operationalise the "New Way of Working" called for at the World Humanitarian Summit of 2016."* LCBC presented the Strategy at the High-Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region hosted by Germany, Nigeria, Norway, and the UN (OCHA and UNDP) in Berlin, September 2018. The conference marked a new chapter in the new way of working as humanitarian, peacebuilding development needs were all part of the conference, departing from the strictly humanitarian approach of the previous Oslo conference on Lake Chad. The combined approach was well-received and resulted in an increase in funding for both humanitarian and development interventions<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Outcome Document, Lake Chad Multi-Disciplinary Expert Meeting on Livelihoods and Water, The Hague, 18-19 Feb 2019.

<sup>4</sup> Some \$2.17 billion in grants were announced (and \$467 million in concessional loans). Of the total figure, some \$1.068 billion (49% of total grants) was made available for humanitarian action, while the peace-building and sustainable development related pledges amounted to USD 1.107 bn. (51%).

## 1.4 The EU Response to the Crisis

The European Commission's Directorate General of European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) has been acknowledged as being one of the first on the ground shortly after the Lake Chad crisis escalated significantly in 2014.

The EU has mobilised substantial support at national, regional and local level and, as of May 2017, more than EUR 700 million had been granted for projects providing emergency relief and humanitarian protection to people in need and contributing to medium to long term development. The European Development Fund (EDF) the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), and the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) through the Sahel/Lake Chad window, have very swiftly and in some instances very innovatively mobilised support in key areas.

At the Oslo II Conference in Berlin in September 2018 the EU pledged EUR 142.6 million to address the Lake Chad crisis and has currently allocated EUR 136.4 million. The EU welcomed the regional approach intrinsic to the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy presented at the Conference. While the Strategy calls for the *New Way of Working* to be central to international response, the EU was already working in this direction, with the selection of Nigeria and Chad as two of pilot countries for the Humanitarian Development nexus.

In early 2017 The EU launched the first integrated 'Nexus' response to the challenges in North east Nigeria of €224M ('Borno Package') combining humanitarian and development and financing that addresses immediate emergency assistance and livelihoods, educational and rehabilitation needs in the State of Borno. This was recently complemented by a smaller action in the State of Yobe, where social protection and livelihood support will be provided.

## 1.5 The UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility

At the request of the Government of Nigeria at the Oslo II Conference in Berlin, and for implementation in the framework of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, the UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility (USD 100 M) is intended to provide a new approach, calibrated to respond to the need for a step-change in the scale and nature of intervention around Lake Chad: speed of response, increased territorial coverage, and improved regional cooperation.

The overall objective of Facility intervention is stabilisation of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin. The Facility has two specific objectives:

- Immediate stabilisation of specific areas, cleared of Boko Haram control, but where communities remain vulnerable to continued infiltration and attack;
- Coordination of extended stabilisation activities across the Boko Haram-affected States and Regions, through support to implementation of the LCBC-AU Regional Stabilisation Strategy, establishing the mechanism and processes required to operationalise the *New Way of Working* and a transition from provision of humanitarian assistance to development and resilience.

Immediate stabilisation activities of the Facility are intended to benefit areas and communities that are considered vulnerable to Boko Haram infiltration and attack, extending an organised and effective civilian security umbrella, consolidating military progress with development 'dividends' for the local population and allowing the military to redirect its efforts to new areas.

The Facility will act as a rapid-response mechanism that relevant authorities can sequence with military operations, to ensure immediate follow-up in specific locations and curtail the ability of Boko Haram to re-infiltrate and exploit any security vacuum or community perceptions of non-responsive Government.

The Facility will enhance civil-military cooperation to design and implement Joint Action Plans<sup>6</sup> for the immediate stabilisation of specific target areas, to increase security and the rule of law as well as to provide infrastructure, basic services and livelihood opportunities in a customised package of assistance.

## **NIGERIA**

Interventions in Nigeria are focused in three states of the North East, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. It is estimated that 1.8 million have been displaced across the 3 states with many in Garrison towns and others in communities outside military control. Within the towns there are often restrictions on freedom of movement undermining opportunities for self-reliance and preventing people from farming or growing crops, making them heavily dependent on humanitarian assistance. Many IDP's live in informal camps with little infrastructure and access to basic services including health and basic education is often restricted or not available.

Residents have cited security as a key concern. Understandably, many continue to fear attacks by non-state armed groups. In some cases, police have not returned, with high incidences of crime reported as well as tensions between communities and the military arising from incidences of GBV, looting, and tensions due to restrictions of freedom of movement, with vigilantes including the Civilian Joint Task Force generally enjoying higher degrees of trust.

Where Police have returned, there is a need to ensure that their presence covers all the community and that they comply with Human Rights, Internal Humanitarian Law and ethics standards. In some communities, women have cited the risk of SGBV when they venture out to water points or to latrines. In other cases, tensions have been reported either between IDP communities, often housed in close proximity and competing for scarce resources or between host communities and IDP's. Capacities for listening to and dealing with disputes in the context of IDP and host communities could be expanded including expanding access to justice services and introducing community policing practices which will contribute to improving collaboration and partnership within the community but also ensuring that Police are able to more effectively work with vulnerable groups including women/girls, children and IDP's

In almost all cases, Courts have been destroyed and the Judiciary not present and when present overstretched as in the case of Mafa for example where the town is now swollen with IDP's. Paralegal services are intermittently present and require bolstering. Traditional systems including the local leadership and religious leaders remain highly trusted although they are highly patriarchal.

In some cases, particularly in Adamawa and Yobe, the authorities have succeeded in securing major strategic towns including strategic access roads outside them, with IDP's now returning back to their communities and livelihoods resuming. In the majority of cases, basic services have been destroyed as well as key government services including the Courts, Police Stations and local government

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<sup>6</sup> Nigeria has developed its JAPs, while the development of JAPs for Cameroon, Chad and Niger are currently a work in progress expected to be finalized by the first quarter of 2020. See Annex 1 for details on Nigeria's JAPs

infrastructure. Restoring key infrastructure within these communities will be essential if they are to return. For example, in Buni Yadi in Yobe, a gateway to Gombé State and prior to the crisis host to one of the largest markets in the region the Government has succeeded in renovating the hospital and primary school and also secured it with military leading to 50,000 now returning. Nevertheless, the secondary school, Courts, Police Stations, part of the market and traditional leaders meeting house has been destroyed. Expansion of Police presence and local conflict resolution mechanisms will improve safety and security in the community and increase the authority/legitimacy of government as will expansion of basic services including education, health and others which will serve in improving the social contract between government and citizens. Rebuilding the market and kick-starting food and animal production and small businesses will also contribute to revitalising the once vibrant economy in this community. This is also the case in many other communities in the region.

## **CAMEROON**

In Cameroon, the insurgency has accounted for 233 attacks causing 558 deaths and 227 injured between January and 20<sup>th</sup> November 2019. Three departments in the Far North regions are in the front line of Boko Haram pressure: Mayo Sava (120 security incidents), Logone et Chari (71 incidents) and May Tsanaga (37 incidents). Despite the number of the attacks registered in Cameroon in 2019, there has been a notable increase in return movements according to Displacement Tracking Matrix conducted by IOM on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2019. In fact, in January 2017, the Far North registered 35665 returnees and on October 2019, the number has increased up to 110,575.<sup>6</sup> This is considered a direct consequence of the security actions implemented by the national forces and by the Multinational Joint Task Force.

However, 487 000 people are currently displaced with high need of protection<sup>7</sup>, access to basic facilities and access to justice. 68 primary schools remained closed whereas 11 are occupied by military forces or IDPs, and 17,610 pupils are affected by the disruption of the education system. Significant human rights abuses have also been recorded, and issues are well known, including – but not limited to – arbitrary detention, poor detention conditions, torture, cruel, ill and degrading treatment, critical access to land and property especially for returnees, access to justice for vulnerable (physical access, economic access, absence of sufficient lawyers and para legal services), the right for women and youth to participate in public management affairs, discrimination against women and lack of gender equality in general.

## **CHAD**

In Chad, 2019 saw the rise of new Boko Haram tactics (the first so-called "complex" attacks on Chadian territory), with the combined use of firearms and improvised explosive devices (four recorded attacks) and the sending of suicide bombers carrying explosive belts. From May 2017 to May 2019, the Boko Haram group perpetuated a total of 35 deadly attacks in the Lac province, mainly against the internal security and defense forces, but also against the civilian population.

Target areas for intervention under the Chad national window of the UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility will include the Kaya, Mamdi and Foulli departments in Lake Province, and the Haraze Al-Biar and Dagana departments of Hadjer Lamis Province. These departments are considered to be directly

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<sup>6</sup> DTM, IOM round 1919

<sup>7</sup> OCHA, Cameroon Extrême Nord, September 2019.



and severely affected by the Boko Haram conflict and require immediate support as part of the rapid stabilisation efforts.

Since the beginning of the crisis, Chad has recorded the arrival of 133,338 IDPs, 42,788 returnees and 2,822 third-country nationals in the Lac province. The population, about 56% women, moved mainly because of the current crisis, the effect of the Boko Haram phenomenon, and settled in 189 registered host sites (including 134 IDP sites and 55 host communities).

Insecurity remains a key aggravating factor and obstacle to economic and social development. The terrorist threat persists despite the presence of the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin area and the action of the internal security forces. Despite the presence of more than 8,000 security personnel in the Lac province, it is clear that Chadian military and civilian personnel as well as the Multinational Joint Task Force are facing financial and technical difficulties that limit their operational capacities (mobility, communication, intelligence), effective action and continued mobilization against the Boko Haram threat. In addition, the absence of public forces in certain island areas leaves a vacuum exploited by terrorist groups despite numerous gendarmerie and National Guard positions that could constitute an important force of proximity and essential to the contact and the service of the population.

## **NIGER**

The first Boko Haram attack on the Nigerien territory dates from February 2015, in the cities of Diffa and Bosso. Since then, and after a short period of calmness, and despite the fact that the State has strengthened its security along its borders, the terrorist activities intensified starting with the month of September 2018. The Boko Haram terrorist group continues to target the defense and security forces and has increased its attacks against civilians. On April 26th 2019, one of Boko Haram's faction has, for the first time in the region, attacked a humanitarian organization compound<sup>8</sup>.

The statistics show a serious escalation of Boko Haram attacks clearly observed in 2019:

- 11, 28 and 114 incidents were reported respectively for the years 2017, 2018 and 2019, of which 11, 22 and 92 happened in the Diffa Region;
- 85 of the 114 incidents reported in 2019 targeted civilians, or approximately 75%;
- 85 incidents against civilians were reported in 2019 compared to 19 in 2018, or an increase of over 400%.

The increasing number of abductions since May 2019 reflects a deterioration of the security conditions in the Region. This increasing insecurity in the riparian areas of Lake Chad, as a result of recurrent attacks by Boko Haram, has led to the prohibition or restriction of access to certain areas (mainly the islands that have been abandoned by their populations) and the closure of certain markets by the Niger authorities; measures considered necessary to securing the area, but which have had the immediate effect a loss of the communities main livelihoods to the extent that access to fertile land is prohibited or limited, and pastoral and commercial mobility is affected, thereby undermining internal and cross-border trade.

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<sup>8</sup> About 788 humanitarian organizations operate in Diffa, of which 10 agencies of the United Nations, 34 international NGO, 30 national NGO and 4 members of the Red Cross.

On September 20th 2019, the Nigerien Government extended until 25 December 2019 the state of emergency in the Diffa Region (as well as in the regions of Tillaberi and Tahoua), first declared in February 2015. The State of emergency aims to restrict people's mobility in order to limit the Boko Haram's group's infiltrations, especially at night, and to ban certain livelihood activities that have been reported by the Niger authorities to be a source of funds to the terrorist group.

In this context, and in line with Niger's adopted national security strategy, a solution combining increased capacity and presence of the defense and security forces, with a stronger community role has been adopted. For stabilization to work and the livelihood and social services support pillars to kick-off, a minimum level of security is indeed required. The target areas in Niger that are expected to benefit from the stabilization programmes include: Bosso, Tam, N'gagam and Baroua pending approval during an upcoming national board meeting in January 2020.

## 2. The Project

### 2.1 Relevance of the Action

#### Overall objective

The overall objective of the “EU Support to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ‘Regional Stabilisation Facility for Lake Chad’ (RSF)” action is to contribute to the immediate stabilisation of the insurgency-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin with a focus on the strengthening of Community Safety and Security and Rule of Law (Output 1 of the Facility). The total cost of the Action is estimated at USD 11,028,999.32 and the EU will provide a contribution up to a maximum of EUR 5,000,000.

The Project herein has twin specific objectives that will contribute to the overall objective:

**Specific Objective 1:** Improve the safety and security of populations and control over lake-bordering territories.

**Specific Objective 2:** Improve Human Rights respect by Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies in the areas of intervention.

Improving physical security for the communities around Lake Chad is fundamental to re-building their trust in Government and a prerequisite for making other investments in infrastructure, services and livelihoods. Improved community safety and security is essential to enable the public to continue to re-engage in socio, economic and political activities, while at the same time increasing their confidence in the ability of security agencies to perform their functions without infringing on the enjoyment of fundamental rights. Security agencies, military and civilian, have a threefold obligation toward human rights: namely, the duty to respect, the duty to protect and the duty to fulfil.

While the situation differs in each country, and between different areas within each country, in many places civilian law enforcement Agencies are either absent or present in insufficient numbers to provide effective security to the communities they serve. This places an undue burden on military forces to carry out a role they are ill-suited to perform. Immediate stabilisation of affected areas requires the deployment of sufficient numbers of trained and equipped law enforcement personnel to ensure transition from military to civilian responsibility for security.

The transition must be carefully managed and sequenced given the dynamic nature of the insurgency. Military presence – and in many areas, the presence of vigilante groups – will remain a fact of life for the foreseeable future. Within existing mandates, the roles and responsibilities of all security actors, and the coordination arrangements between them, will need to be customised to the different levels of insecurity experienced in each specific area, and security-related infrastructure and equipment needs to be available to support the deployment of the requisite additional civilian law enforcement personnel that will be required in most instances.

Security responses by military forces, police or vigilante groups that pay insufficient respect to human rights risk alienating stressed communities, feeding narratives of radicalisation and undermining their

own objectives<sup>9</sup>. A *rights-based approach* to combating extremism is not just a moral imperative, but at the heart of smart counter-insurgency tactics.

To date, national and cross-border security responses to the Lake Chad crisis have been dogged by allegations of human rights violations, damaging the relations of trust that need to exist between security providers and local communities, undermining confidence in the social contract and feeding extremist narratives of corrupt and unresponsive Government. The need to strengthen *human rights systems*, through further support to Governments, Human Rights Institutions and human rights defenders, security providers and through communities themselves is clearly recognised: Security and Human Rights comprises Pillar 2 of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, and international assistance in other areas – both military and development assistance – continues to be inhibited while violations occur and a culture of impunity is perceived to exist.

Security providers – military forces<sup>10</sup>, civilian law enforcement Agencies, vigilante groups – require pre-deployment and refresher training in human rights, international humanitarian law, and civilian harm reduction; field manuals and procedures need to be in place. All trainings must have a strong focus on the rights of women and girls given the high levels of sexual and gender-based violence that has characterised the conflict around Lake Chad on all sides. The compliance of Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies with international and national Human Rights regulations is crucial to reduce/mitigate the risks of violations and abuses – it will also contribute to restoring the trust between the populations and Security Forces.

Accountability mechanisms must also be strengthened. Legal frameworks, rules of engagement, codes of conduct and standard operating procedures should be reviewed, updated, and given higher visibility and priority. Internal and external oversight mechanisms of security providers need to be more fully engaged and developed in regard to receiving complaints, interviewing and investigation, record keeping and case management. A system for regular analysis of cases needs to be in place to identify and address systemic, location, or unit-specific issues. Formal and transitional justice mechanisms need training on receiving and managing public complaints against security agencies. Calibrated redress measures need to be agreed, available, and applied, eg, judicial processes, Court Marshalls, compensation/reparation, public apologies.

In addition, as part of a broader effort to increase access to justice generally, National Human Rights Institutions and independent human rights defenders should be a visible and regular presence on the ground in all insurgency-affected areas, to hear and record community grievances and to ensure that all security providers – military, police, vigilante groups – operate to the highest possible standards of behaviour in respect to the local population. Regular presence and reporting to all stakeholders can serve to deter violations, increase transparency, and reassure communities that their rights will be respected. Public engagement in certain planning processes and in design of community security mechanisms such as networks on peace, can be utilised to promote voice and accountability and create a sense of ownership by the affected community in security actions that concern them.

As stabilisation efforts move into new areas, resident and returning populations must be engaged on an inclusive, participatory, gender and age-balanced basis, to represent the community in decision-making on arrangements for security provision. Community engagement mechanisms have an

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<sup>9</sup> Findings of UNDP's study *Journey to Extremism in Africa* suggest that for 71% of interviewees, including a significant cohort of ex-Boko Haram fighters, the 'tipping point' which prompted them to turn to violence was Government security actions. *Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, incentives and the tipping point for recruitment*, p. 74, UNDP 2016

<sup>10</sup> This action will not have military as "direct beneficiaries".

important role to play in early warning and response, reporting, future return and reintegration of released or low-risk Boko Haram-associated persons, and the development of new initiative for early recovery and resilience. Such mechanisms need to bring security providers and local communities together in a common effort to identify and address local security priorities, as a first step toward rebuilding the social contract, and toward isolating and defeating the insurgency.

### 2.3 Methodology and foreseen activities

The Project is considered a component of the UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility and will be fully integrated into the broader work of the Facility for 'immediate' stabilisation.

The Facility aims to establish a process for immediate stabilisation that is able to address the needs of target areas with different degrees of insecurity. The overall process of stabilisation must encompass the phased transition of insecure areas toward greater security, and the reduction of current volatility whereby previously secure areas have become more rather than less vulnerable. Wherever possible, immediate stabilisation should progress on contiguous territory, in order to better advance freedom of movement (considered as a useful proxy for a certain level of community security necessary to the ability to resume provision of Government services and for the local population to engage safely in livelihood activities).

The selection of target communities for immediate stabilization intervention is understood as a matter for National authorities, to be based upon political and strategic (economy and population) considerations, military concept of operations, and availability of the necessary State and military resources to make the intervention a success.

Target areas for Facility intervention have been agreed with national authorities in all countries except Niger, which should be agreed upon during the upcoming national board meeting in January 2020.. Security providers, State Government representatives, and Regional Stabilisation Facility staff are currently working together to prepare a Joint Action Plan (JAP) for each target area. JAPs were completed for Nigeria in October; are slated for finalisation in Cameroon and Chad in mid-December; and will be prepared for Niger in February 2020. Each Joint Action Plan has three components, covering each of the three pillars of intervention Regional Stabilisation Facility: security and the rule of law; essential infrastructure and provision of basic services; livelihoods.

#### **NIGERIA**

In the case of Nigeria, the Facility will work in six areas, comprising three communities in Borno (Banki, Damboa, Monguno and Ngarannam), two communities in Yobe (Buni Yadi and Kanama) and one community in Adamawa (Gulak). They can be grouped according to three typologies: 1) Garrison Towns, enclaves controlled by the Nigerian Military and where there are large numbers of IDP's living with host communities often faced with restrictions on movement: Banki, Damboa, Monguno fit this typology; 2) towns which have been secured, where there are large scale returns taking place, the local economy is re-starting but where local services including provision of rule of law/security providers is absent (Buni Yadi, Gulak and Kanama); and 3) communities which have been destroyed and where the Government wants to prioritise township expansion with a *build back better* approach, as in the case of Ngarannam.

At the national level the Project in Nigeria will work with the Nigerian Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and Federal Police including the Staff Training College and Police Complaints Board. At the State Level, UNDP's partners will include the State Governments, State Police, local and international

NGO's and local human rights defenders. These partnerships will be particularly relevant when it comes to working on pre-deployment training, mentoring and on the job training of Police and community representatives around community policing issues. The NHRC and civil society partnerships will be key to the establishment of a robust monitoring mechanism.

Within the communities, UNDP will work closely with Traditional Leaders, key stakeholders within the community i.e. religious leaders, private sector, local police, NGO's providing services etc. Joint Action Plans for the selected communities in Nigeria have already been prepared. The Joint Action Plans have been approved by a Technical Committee comprised of Government, Donors, State Governor Representatives and UNDP in early November and are expected to be approved by the Facility Steering Committee at the end of November. Activities will be initiated in early 2020.

## **CAMEROON**

Joint Action Plans are being finalised for 9 communities already selected with national authorities: Blangoua, Kolofata, Hile Alifa, Fotokol, Waza, Mora, Mayo Moskota in the Extreme North Region, and Mayo Oulo and Demsa in North Region.

A standard package of assistance has been agreed to include the following elements: Construction and equipment of police stations and border posts; reinforcement of the early warning system of the vigilantes; support to the justice and traditional justice; training for Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies on Human right, community policing, and counter-terrorism approaches approach; support to community dialogue.

Once completed, the JAPs will be submitted to the approval by the governors of the two affected regions. Actors to be involved in Cameroon from the planning stage include the Human Rights Commission and key national NGOs with long monitoring experience, active in UNDP's current platform for prevention of violent extremism.

## **CHAD**

A joint scoping mission was carried out from 27 September to 02 October 2019 in the provinces of Hadjer Lamis and Lac in order to define the target areas in Chad with local authorities and communities. This mission comprised representatives of the Ministries of Economy and Development Planning, Territory Administration and Defense and Public Security, relevant local authorities and UNDP staff meeting with local communities.

In Hadjer Lamis province, a meeting with all stakeholders, chaired by the Governor of the province, prioritised the Departments of Haraz Albiar (Guitare, Miterine, Mahada communes) and of Dagana (Kassalaré, Baltram, Sidjie communes). The target areas were selected as corridors through which Boko Haram move toward the Lake and the rest of the country on the one hand, or towards Nigeria and Cameroon on the other hand. Because of the threat of Boko Haram, these areas have lost their economic dynamism because they were areas of fish and other food coming from the banks of Cameroon or Nigeria and vice versa, and a majority of the population left their homes in 2015 and 2016 following a spate of attacks.

For Region du Lac, separate meetings were held with administrative and military authorities on the one hand and traditional and religious authorities as well as youth and women's organizations on the other hand, prior to a validation process with all stakeholders. In Mamdi Department, Ngallamia, Selia, Gómrom Doumou communes were selected; in Kaya Department, Kulkime, Chukubul, Toumour Ngarroua communes.

Since the beginning of the Boko Haram crisis, the Lac province has been under heavy pressure from the actions of the Boko Haram elements. Virtually all areas of the Mamdi Department are affected, forcing people in the island areas and neighboring towns of the city of Bol to leave their villages or townships or move temporarily to the Kaya Department. This situation has resulted in a weakening of economic activities, a cessation of rural activities and fishing, a social fabric completely shaken and cross-border trade significantly reduced. In addition to this, the state authority has been considerably weakened and the basic structures destroyed because of the multiplication of attacks against the representatives of the State or the administrations.

## **NIGER**

In the case of Niger, Joint Action Plans (JAPs) will focus on four communities in the region of Diffa: Bosso (Bosso Commune); Ngagam (Gueskerou Commune); Baroua (Bosso Commune); Tam (Mainé Soroa Commune). These communities were selected by regional authorities (Governor of the region of Diffa) and validated by the Haute Autorité Pour la Consolidation de la Paix (HACP) for a number of reasons: military presence, where there are large scale returnees and IDPs living with host communities often faced with restrictions on movement, communities which have been secured, for their strategic geographic positions, the local economy is re-starting but where local services including provision of rule of law/security providers is absent, finally communities that have been destroyed and where the Government wants to prioritize build back and stabilization.

All 12 communes in the region of Diffa possess communal stabilization plans and communal development plans which will be used as key instruments for the elaboration of the Joint Action Plans. When the JAPs will be elaborated, they will be approved by a Technical Committee comprised of Governor of the Region of Diffa, the President of the region of Diffa regional council, UNDP, members of the regional security council, MNJTF, HACP, Prefets, Mayors, regional technical services, SDS, National Commission on Human Rights, Customary chiefs, Religious leaders, Women's representatives, Youth Representatives and civil society organizations in early February 2020.

At the national level, the project in Niger will be under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security (which has an overview and oversight on the National Police for public security and community policing issues, National Gendarmerie and National Guard), the Ministry of Defense (which has an overview and oversight on the Niger Military and the Military Engineering Corps which will be used for the construction of infrastructures) and the Secrétariat Exécutif de la Stratégie pour le Développement et la Sécurité dans les Zones Sahélo-Sahariennes du Niger (SE - SDS Sahel-Niger) for coordination and complementarity on stabilization. UNDP will work closely with civil society organizations necessary for establishment of a robust monitoring mechanism. Within the communities, UNDP will work closely with traditional and religious Leaders, key stakeholders such as technical services, women, youth, private sector, local police, NGO's providing services etc.

### **Output 1.1: Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies are deployed in target areas and better able to provide security to local communities**

The first priority of the Project will be to support relevant authorities to establish a clear methodology in each State/Region for the overall stabilisation process, and to establish the civil-military cooperation mechanism to ensure the functional coordination arrangements on security that will be needed to deliver stabilisation according to the specific needs pertaining in the different levels of target area.

The process of preparing Joint Action Plans for the target areas, and implementation of the necessary steps in those target areas to transition security arrangements from military control to civilian law enforcement, requires an *ad hoc*, Facility-specific Security Planning Group to be established and to meet on a regular basis. The basis, mandate, and composition of each Security Planning Group will be determined in consultation with relevant national and local authorities per State/Region.

### **NIGERIA**

In Nigeria, UNDP has recruited a CIMIC Advisor who will work on establishment of the facility specific security planning group. Once established this group will be incorporated into state level coordination systems which are already operational. The project will work with the Police utilising curriculums and approaches they already have in place in other parts of the country to embed community policing practices in the north east.

At the local level the project envisions the follows in terms of infrastructure and soft support within the framework of this project (see Joint Action Plans in Annex for complete plan). This is based on assessments that have already taken place and are now agreed with the Nigerian Government.

### **NIGER**

In Niger, the project will be supervised by the Ministry of Interior and Public Security and the National Police to institutionalise the community policing strategy and make it operational in the target zones, work with the Ministry of Defence to coordinate security interventions for the Military and civil-military coordination and to establish partnerships with the Military Engineering Corps for the construction of infrastructure. Establishment of the facility specific security planning and coordination group will be organised by the UNDP Governance, Peace & Security Adviser. Once established this group will be incorporated into state level coordination mechanisms working on the Diffa crisis exit strategy and the reintegration of former Boko Haram associates which are already operational. Composition and remit of Security Planning Groups are subject to ongoing discussion with the Governments of Cameroon and Chad.

Each Security Planning Group will discuss and agree roles, functions and likely priorities of security providers in each of the selected target area, establishing the differentiated coordination arrangements that should exist, and identifying the key capacity constraints of each actor to fulfil them. The Project will work with all partners to ensure that civilian law enforcement Agencies present in the target areas in sufficient numbers, with the training, equipment, means of communication and transport necessary to fulfil the roles and responsibilities prioritised by each Security Planning Group.

Civilian law enforcement Agencies are expected to provide the relevant number of trained officers for permanent deployment to each target area according to a schedule to be agreed in each Joint Action Plan and accompanying agreements to be signed between UNDP and specific Agencies. Agreements will specify implementation arrangements, timelines for delivery, and budget allocations per activity for each target area.

The Project will provide new or rebuilt police stations, furnished dormitory accommodation, vehicles, communications and other specialised equipment necessary to support the deployment. Advance



procurement and pre-positioning of supplies may be undertaken to support timely and effective deployment.

As previously, Joint Action Plans have yet to be finalised in Cameroon and Chad (December 2019) and in Niger (February 2020), and it is not yet possible to give precise figures in regard to beneficiaries, activities to be conducted, baseline data and targets to be achieved. This information will be collated and presented in the Inception Phase report for the project, for approval by the European Union at the end of month 3 of the implementation period.

#### PROJECT ACTIVITIES ACROSS NATIONAL WINDOWS

<b>Activity 1.1.1</b>	<b>Enhanced Coordination on Security in the Target Areas</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Establish ad/hoc Security Planning Groups (SPGs) for each State/Region</li> <li>➤ Agree coordination arrangements on security for each specific target</li> <li>➤ Definition of target area capacity gaps of relevant law enforcement Agencies (personnel, infrastructure, equipment, training)</li> <li>➤ HRDDP assessment of security actors in the target areas</li> </ul>
Inputs	Stabilisation Advisers
Timeframe	Inception Phase
<b>Activity 1.1.2</b>	<b>Increasing Law Enforcement Presence in the Target Areas</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Assess, design and construct security-related infrastructure for civilian law enforcement Agencies (police stations, dormitory accommodation, perimeter trenches, checkpoints and observation posts etc.)</li> <li>➤ Provide vehicles, communication and specialised equipment to standard specification to meet Agency capacity needs identified (Activity 1.1.1)</li> </ul>
Inputs	Engineers, procurement specialist, contracts
Timeframe	Quarters 2-4
<b>Activity 1.1.3</b>	<b>Improving Law Enforcement Capacities in the Target Areas</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Establish Agency-specific SOPs to implement SPG-defined coordination arrangements for each target area, including management of teams and patrols, schedules and reporting</li> <li>➤ Provide training in front-desk and related procedures and recording of statements from victims and witnesses</li> <li>➤ Build capacities for basic record-keeping, storage and management of archives</li> </ul>
Inputs	DPKO and other experts, training costs, equipment procurement
Timeframe	Quarters 3-6

**Output 1.2: The capacities of Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies related to compliance with Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Regulations are reinforced and contribute to improve their relations with the populations**

Following selection of target areas and preparation of Joint Action Plans, the Project will undertake a review of the legal frameworks, rules of engagement, standard operating procedures and codes of conduct of the security providers present or to be deployed in each area. The review will make recommendations for strengthening these as necessary and will offer technical assistance support to any revisions agreed as necessary. It will also promote appointment of focal points for Human Rights and Gender at all levels, where these do not currently exist, to integrate human rights and IHL in the planning and conduct of operations. A particular focus will be given to the operation of human rights desks in the target areas to strengthen relations with local communities and respond to specific incidents and/or general concerns.

A mapping exercise will be undertaken of existing programmes for pre-deployment and refresher training of security personnel in the four countries in regard to human rights, international humanitarian law and civilian protection, as well as in sexual and gender-based violence. In concert with UNOHCHR, and in coordination with other assistance providers, the Project will seek to identify and meet gaps identified and scale-up assistance as necessary. Training curricula will be updated based on accepted recommendations of the assessment/gaps analysis, and specific training will be developed and given to focal points for Human Rights and Gender to serve in target areas of the Facility.

The Project will further support security providers with the development of updated procedures, manuals and other materials, and will ensure widespread dissemination to all units and personnel serving within the target areas. With and through the focal points to be established, the Project will establish a methodology for After-Action Reviews to identify best practices and lessons-learned related to human rights and address the consequences of operations on the local population. These will be applied in each target area as part of the overall monitoring and evaluation of Joint Action Plan implementation.

In Nigeria, UNDP will work with the Federal and State Police for the review of codes of conduct and SOP's as they relate to human rights. The Nigerian Police has an established model on community policing which will be utilised as it relates to training curricula and mentoring with modifications as related to the local context.

UNDP Cameroon has been engaged with provision of capacity development to security providers since 2017, with support of the Federal Government of Germany and more than a 100 police officers, gendarmes or other actors have been trained on Human Rights to date. This work will be scaled-up within the new project and a strong monitoring system established to trace and measure impact as fully as possible.

The same work will be initiated for police and gendarmerie in Chad under the project herein: in discussion with national authorities, UNDP has identified a particular need to extend training to public security forces in order to strengthen their capabilities on international human rights mechanisms.

In Niger, UNDP work with the Government through the Ministry of Interior and Public Security and the Ministry of Defence to effectuate the reviews of codes of conduct and SOP's as they relate to human rights. Trainings will be conducted in International Humanitarian Law and human rights principles to security and defence agents. The National Police academy will be used to train security agents on human rights issues and the concept of community policing.

<b>Activity 1.2.1</b>	<b><i>Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms of Security Providers</i></b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Assess and develop legal frameworks and codes of conduct of relevant security providers as necessary</li> <li>➤ Promote appointment of focal points for Human Rights and Gender who will contribute to integrating human rights and IHL in the planning and conduct of operations</li> <li>➤ Strengthen operation of the human rights desk in the operational areas;</li> <li>➤ Support CSOs to improve access to justice for local communities in the target areas in respect of human rights, sexual and gender-based violence etc.</li> <li>➤ Provide training to formal and transitional justice arrangements to receive and manage cases in regard to human rights, sexual and gender-based violence etc.</li> <li>➤ Internal and external oversight mechanisms for recognition and enforcement of practice against code of conduct agreed and adopted.</li> </ul>
<b>Inputs</b>	Consultants, Workshops, Minor equipment, sub-project agreements with CSOs and NGOs
<b>Timeframe</b>	Inception Phase assessment; implementation months 4-24
<b>Activity 1.2.2</b>	<b><i>Training of Security Personnel</i></b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Assess capacities and undertake gaps analysis of pre-deployment training and refresher programmes on human rights, international humanitarian law and civilian protection, sexual and gender-based violence for personnel of all security agencies</li> <li>➤ Support updating of training curricula according to accepted recommendations of gap analysis</li> <li>➤ Provide additional training on human rights, IHL and civilian protection, SGBV for personnel to be deployed in target areas of the Facility as needed</li> <li>➤ Provide training of focal points for Human Rights and Gender to serve in target areas of the Facility</li> </ul>
<b>Inputs</b>	<b><i>Consultants, Training Budget</i></b>
<b>Timeframe</b>	Inception Phase assessment; implementation months 4-24

<b>Activity 1.2.3</b>	<b><i>Development of Manuals and Procedures for Accountability</i></b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Develop tools and manuals for security agencies, law enforcement officials and other practitioners on the implementation of international standards (Cameroon and Nigeria only)<sup>11</sup></li> <li>➤ Disseminate tools and manuals to all units in target areas, including rules of engagement and codes of conduct to all serving personnel</li> <li>➤ Establish procedures for After-Action Reviews to identify best practices and lessons-learnt related to human rights and address the consequences of the operations on the population, including by adapting the modus operandi;</li> <li>➤ Public participation as applicable ensured in processes of procedure re/design</li> </ul>
<b>Inputs</b>	Consultants, materials and publications budget, workshops
<b>Timeframe</b>	Months 4-24

**Output 2.1 Human Rights are better respected and Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies are accountable for this**

The Facility will support human rights monitoring and reporting in the target areas, as part of a broader effort to promote accountability and compliance with all international and continental norms and standards that nurtures relations of trust and confidence between security providers and local communities.

Civil society human rights organisations in each country will be supported to establish regular operation presence in the target areas, and to undertake ongoing monitoring and quarterly reporting detailing individual incidents and summarising the human rights situation in general.

UNDP Nigeria has already selected NGO partners based on a competitive and transparent selection process, who will conduct independent monitoring of human rights related issues in the 8 communities where JAPS will be undertaken & which will be shared with partners. The project will also build monitoring into contracts with NGO's as it relates to planned activities i.e. support to stabilisation committees (see Activity 1.2.2).

In Cameroon, it is proposed to launch a call for partnership in Human Rights monitoring shortly. UNDP will coordinate with the UN OHCHR, UNICEF and UN Women to move toward an integrated and comprehensive monitoring umbrella.

In Chad, working with OHCHR and the ICRC is considered essential to meet the expectations of the population through the capacity-building plans of the public security forces and vigilante committees, as well as those of administrative and traditional authorities.

<sup>11</sup> This activity will cover Cameroon and Nigeria only given EU support already provided to Chad and Niger through the programme 'Support to G5 Sahel member States' Security Forces to fight against impunity and reinforce their relations with the population'.

Monitoring missions will be conducted in tandem with dedicated project staff to ensure coherence and independent witness to encourage reporting of Human Rights violations or concerns.

Quarterly Human Rights monitoring reports are intended both to act as early warning and to document violations and atrocities. The information can be used to later show if a determination of war crimes or crimes against humanity can be made before it is too late to respond.

Reports will be shared with partners on implementation of the Joint Action Plans and will be available to UN OHCHR and the Partner Platform in each country. Support will be given to the engagement of all Lake Chad countries with international human rights mechanisms to enhance realisation of human rights in the operational area.

<b>Activity 2.1.1</b>	<b><i>Conflict Sensitivity Analysis &amp; Baseline Surveys</i></b>
<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Undertake Local Conflict Analyses of target areas</li> <li>➤ Organise baseline surveys of human rights situation in each target area in coordination with National Human Rights Institutions and UNOHCHR</li> <li>➤</li> </ul>
<b>Inputs</b>	Agreements with NGOs, NHRIs
<b>Timeframe</b>	Inception Phase
<b>Activity 2.1.2</b>	<b><i>Human Rights Monitoring in Target Areas</i></b>
<b>Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Establish methodology and reporting requirements for monitoring regime in close coordination with UNOHCHR</li> <li>➤ Identify and partner with relevant national human rights organisations &amp; develop capacities for monitoring operations</li> <li>➤ Undertake regular monitoring missions to target areas</li> </ul>
<b>Inputs</b>	Human Rights Specialist, IUNVs, agreements with NHRIs and local human rights defenders
<b>Timeframe</b>	Inception Phase monitoring regime and partnership; quarterly monitoring implementation period, months 4-24
<b>Activity 2.1.3</b>	<b><i>Human Rights Reporting</i></b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Produce quarterly Human Rights monitoring reports for all target areas for review by UNOHCHR, Partner Platforms and LCBC</li> <li>➤ Organise regional workshop on human rights under umbrella of LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy</li> <li>➤</li> </ul>
<b>Inputs</b>	Human Rights Adviser, IUNVs, Consultants, Conference budget
<b>Timeframe</b>	Implementation period, months 4-24

**Output 2.2** Local populations have regained trust in Security Forces and State Authorities

Stabilisation Committees are intended to ensure community engagement in the process of establishing public safety and security in each target area. They should seek to promote the active involvement of communities in reporting problems or security threats, a culture of looking out for fellow community members, and of alternative dispute resolution to prevent conflicts becoming violent, as well as an effective system of vetting, verifying, recording and acting on public observations.

Stabilisation Committees are intended as the primary mechanism for organising community consultations on infrastructure design and works, and definition of livelihood options. They will also have a key role to play in facilitating rapid appraisals and preparing and/or validating household lists and identification of beneficiaries for livelihoods initiatives.

Stabilisation Committees should be headed by local Government officials, and comprise representatives of all security providers, including vigilante groups. Community representatives should include community leaders and elders as well as representatives of local business, women's groups and youth groups etc.

In advance of intervention in each selected target area, a rapid local conflict analysis will be undertaken, to map the situation at the granular level necessary to ensure that the proposed intervention is appropriate and fully conforms with the principle of "*do no harm*". It is vital to avoid exacerbating any existing tensions, or – wherever possible – being seen to work through, or otherwise favour, those who have previously abused power.

Community perception studies of the local security situation are also essential because perceptions matter as much as reality if the intervention is to contribute toward "*winning the peace*" by responding to grassroots concern. Such studies should be used to establish baselines against which the overall success of the intervention can be measured. The Stabilisation Committees will review the findings of the local Perception Studies on Public Safety and Security, prepare Public Safety and Security Plans in response, and contribute to implementation/oversight of Facility sub-projects to work to be funded by the Facility from an unearmarked budget line reserved for this purpose.

Stabilisation Committees will be supported to organise communication mechanisms and dialogue activities between target area communities and local security providers. Workshops will be organised for key target groups (youth, women etc.) on the mandates and structure of security providers, on Human Rights and procedures for reporting Human Rights violations.

On the basis of needs identified in the Public Safety and Security Plans, small-scale sub-projects will be formulated and implemented to address the issues as required. Wherever possible, all sub-project interventions will involve representation and/or active participation of local security providers in order to increase acceptance and engagement build relations of trust between communities and security forces.

In some of the target areas selected, inclusive and participatory community consultation mechanisms already exist, for purposes of liaison with security actors. Rather than establish new structures, the project herein will adapt, support and/or reinforce existing mechanisms.

In Nigeria, and NGO has been contracted to undertake ongoing perception surveys over the course of Facility implementation.

Since 2017 UNDP Cameroon has been working with the Roger Milla Foundation and the National Olympic Committee on a number of social cohesion activities bringing security forces and local communities together. These initiatives have started to demonstrate positive results, with increased collaboration and confidence developing between border communities and security actors. UNDP Cameroon will scale up these initiatives with this project.

At the community level in Niger, UNDP will put in place local management committees in all 4 targeted pilot communities composed of - Community Head, Religious leader(s), Women's representatives, Youth Representatives and Representative of the elderly. These committees will liaise with security and defence forces for effective coordination and community. Throughout the period of project implementation, perception surveys will be conducted to assess the level of project implantation, civil military coordination, trust and collaboration between the communities and security forces and the level of community engagement in the project approach.

<b>Activity 2.2.1</b>	<b><i>Stabilisation Committees Established in each Target Area</i></b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Conduct Community Perception Studies on Security in target areas inform -design of security component of Joint Action Plans</li> <li>➤ Establish inclusive and participatory Stabilisation Committees in each target area building on perception studies and conflict analyses;</li> <li>➤ Facilitate development of Public Safety and Security plans by each Stabilisation Committee</li> <li>➤ Capacity development of Stabilisation Committees for early warning and response.</li> </ul>
<b>Inputs</b>	Agreements with NGOs, IUNVs, Workshops
<b>Timeframe</b>	Inception Phase, Months 1-3, and Implementation Phase, Months 4-12
<b>Activity 2.2.2</b>	<b><i>Community Engagement on Security</i></b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Community workshops on mandate of security providers, to be organised by Agency Focal Points to be established (see Activity 1.2.1)</li> <li>➤ Community workshops on Human Rights and procedures for reporting Human Rights violations</li> <li>➤ Disseminate and validate Stabilisation Committee Public Safety and Security Plans with wider community in each target area.</li> <li>➤ Mechanism for public complaints handling designed and piloted in target areas of each country</li> </ul>
<b>Inputs</b>	Workshops, publications/communications budget, consultants
<b>Timeframe</b>	Implementation period, months 4-24
<b>Activity 2.2.3</b>	<b><i>Responding to Community-identified Security Priorities</i></b>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Design and implement sub-projects to respond to community-identified needs of the Public Safety and Security Plans</li> <li>➤ Organise representation/involvement of security providers in sub-project implementation and participatory approach to monitoring and evaluation of sub-project implementation</li> <li>➤ Conduct repeat Community Perception Studies on Security at end of intervention to assess impact and change in relations between population and security providers</li> </ul>
<b>Inputs</b>	QIPS budget, Engineers, Workshops, Agreements with NGOs
<b>Timeframe</b>	Implementation period, months 4-24

## 2.4 Project Approach: Cross-Cutting Issues

### 2.4.1 Conflict Sensitivity and Community Engagement

The Boko Haram insurgency developed from, and is sustained by, communities alienated by decades of development neglect and marginalisation. It is considered necessary to ‘*win the peace*’ in order to win the war – the UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility, and the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy it serves, seek to contribute to a renewal of the social contract between the State and the population around Lake Chad.

Overall, an inclusive and participatory approach is understood as vital to address a number of human security priorities of the immediate stabilisation process. Only an inclusive approach will ensure that implemented actions respond to local perceptions and realities. Local communities need to be supported to define their own security needs and be empowered, as much as possible, to address these themselves.<sup>12</sup>

Programmatically, UNDP will integrate key indicators of divisions and tensions in the regular monitoring activities of the Facility to ensure that exacerbating tensions and trends can quickly be detected with a conflict analysis approach. The integration of key indicators on tensions within the Facility’s M&E framework will also ensure feedback into the Facility and allow for review and modification of activities to address deteriorating dynamics within affected communities.

A key stratagem of the Project will be to actively engage communities in the design and implementation of specific activities. To ensure development is community-driven, the Facility will place significant emphasis on identifying, strengthening and working through inclusive and participatory dialogue mechanisms at community level<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> See conclusions recorded in the Outcome Document, Lake Chad Multi-Disciplinary Expert Meeting on Livelihoods and Water, The Hague, 18-19 February 2019.

<sup>13</sup> Including local government participation with the aim to create trust and build the social contract between the authorities and the involved communities. As security will continue to be an important challenge, coordination with (or inclusion of) representatives of legitimate security forces will be required.



Stabilisation Committees<sup>14</sup> will drive participatory planning and decision-making to define and implement community-defined priorities. Stabilisation Committees will receive mentored capacity development support to undertake analysis, targeting, risk planning and integrated monitoring, to act as community mechanisms for early warning and response, and to serve as primary interlocutors for the Facility and its private sector and CSO partners. Stabilisation Committees will be given the means to involve the broader community in dialogue processes around security, rights and immediate stabilisation, and to develop strategic communications to ensure community access to information.

Partner Platforms in each country – the governance structure of the Project at national level (see Section 3.6) – will include representation from the Stabilisation Committees to be established, in order to ensure community voices in Project decision-making.

#### 2.4.2 A Focus on Youth

In terms of targeting within communities, the Facility will ensure a strong focus on youth, both as beneficiaries of the Programme, and as agents of it. The dire state of local economies has contributed to a sense of hopelessness amongst many young people across the Lake Chad Region. This hopelessness underpins recruitment into radical and extremist groups, but it also drives migration, youth crime and delinquency, and drug abuse to escape the hardships of daily life and the lack of vision that many young people hold for the future.

Youth constitute the majority of the population in the region. The usual conception of youth as covering the years 18-35 will be extended lower in response to UNDP research into the personal journeys of violent extremists, indicating the prevalence of radicalisation between the ages of 14-17.<sup>15</sup>

The important and positive contributions that young people can make and are making for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security in the world are recognised by the Security Council in Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security, unanimously adopted in December 2015.

#### 2.4.3 Addressing the Situation of Women & Girls

Issues of gender are at the heart of the crisis around Lake Chad and will be central to its sustainable resolution. Pillar nine of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy calls for specific actions to tackle a culture in which sexual and gender-based violence has become endemic and calls for a gender-sensitive approach to be mainstreamed into all responses.

All Joint Action Plans of the Regional Stabilisation Facility will be audited by the UNDP gender team in each Country Office prior to presentation to Partner Platforms for review and approval. The Project

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<sup>14</sup> Depending on the country and area, coordination mechanisms are peace committees, peace and development committees, security committees, among many others. The team will build on the coordination mechanism present in the area of intervention or help create one, in the unlikely event no coordination mechanism exists.

<sup>15</sup> Research based on survey of 400 known extremists, average age 21, UNDP *Regional Programme for Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa*, 2015.

herein envisages a specific set of actions specifically aimed at the protection and empowerment of women and girls.

The strengthening of community safety and security should particularly benefit women and girls. Women have an important role to play in peacebuilding, as recognised by UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015) on Women, Peace & Security. UNDP will ensure a gender balance on all mechanisms for community engagement and decision-making forums on security as far as possible. The Project will capture gender disaggregated data in the perceptions of security in the studies to be undertaken. This can be used to support prioritisation of quick impact projects in response, eg. extending security patrols to offer some protection from insurgents and harassment while working in the fields or collecting firewood/water etc.

Activities will also include specific action to raise awareness of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in communities, as well as to mobilise and advocate against it. Monitoring and reporting on SGBV will be included in the remit of work to be undertaken by human rights defenders. Gender awareness will be integrated into training of security providers – military, police, community vigilante groups – for avoidance of civilian harm.

## 2.5 Logical Framework Matrix

An initial logical framework matrix for the Project appears overleaf. The matrix will be further detailed and refined during the Inception Phase of the Project and will be submitted as part of the Inception Phase Report for EU approval.

Logical Framework Matrix

	<b>RESULTS CHAIN: Main expected results</b>	<b>INDICATORS</b>
<b>IMPACT (Overall objective)</b>	The overall objective of the action is to contribute to the immediate stabilisation of insurgency-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin with a focus on the strengthening of Community Safety and Security and the Rule of Law (output 1 of the Facility).	<p>1. Effective presence of Security and Law Enforcement Agencies in target areas providing security to populations.</p> <p>2. Improved perception and confidence of populations towards Security and Law Enforcement Agencies.</p>
<b>OUTCOME(S) (Specific Objectives)</b>	<b>Specific Objective 1:</b> Improve the safety and security of populations and control over lake-bordering territories.	<p>1. Number of Security Force Enforcement Agents trained in Human Rights including Gender balance (desegregated by sex)</p> <p>2. Number and type of incidents reported by Security Forces</p> <p>3. Number of interventions/patrols reported in target areas</p>
	<b>Specific Objective 2:</b> Improve Human Rights respect by Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies in the areas of intervention.	<p>4. Increased knowledge of Security Forces/Law Enforcement Agencies on Human Rights</p> <p>5. Number of Human Rights reports received</p> <p>6. Number of Human Rights reports filed</p> <p>7. Perception of Security Forces by populations</p>

<b>OUTPUTS</b>	<b>Output 1.1: Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies are deployed in target areas and better able to provide security to local communities.</b>	<b>1.1.1: Enhanced Coordination of Security in the Target Areas</b>	1.1.1.1 Establish ad hoc Security Planning Groups (SPGs) for each State/Region	Number of SPGs established Number of target States/Regions covered. Number of SPG meetings held
			1.1.1.2 Agree coordination arrangements on security for each specific target	Number of coordination agreements agreed. Number of selected target areas
			1.1.1.3 Definition of target area capacity gaps of relevant law enforcement Agencies (personnel, infrastructure, equipment, training)	Number of personnel, infrastructure, equipment, training material lacking.
		<b>1.1.2: Increasing Law Enforcement Presence in the Target Areas</b>	1.1.2.1: Assess, design and construct security-related infrastructure for civilian law enforcement Agencies	Number of police stations, dormitories, accommodations, perimeter checkpoints and observation posts renovated for Security Forces
			1.1.2.2: Provide vehicles, communication and specialized equipment to standard specification to meet Agency capacity needs identified.	Number of vehicles and ICT delivered to Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agents.
		<b>1.1.3: Improving Law Enforcement Capacities in the Target Areas</b>	1.1.3.1: Establish Agency-specific SOPs to implement SPF-defined coordination arrangements for each target area, including management of teams and patrols, schedules and reporting.	Number of SOPs established Number of teams and patrols Number of schedules and reports produced.
			1.1.3.2: Provide training in front-desk and related procedures and recording of statements from victims and witnesses.	Number of individuals trained
			1.1.3.3: Build capacities for record-keeping, storage and management of archives.	Number of trainings or technical assistance provided. Number of national records arranged, and managed. Number of national archives managed."

<b>OUTPUTS</b>	<b>Output 1. 2: The capacities of Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies related to compliance with Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Regulations are reinforced and contribute to improve their relationships with the populations</b>	<b>1.2.1: Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms of Security Providers</b>	1.2.1.1: Assess and develop legal frameworks and codes of conduct of relevant security providers as necessary	Number of legal frameworks or codes of conduct assessed and developed
			1.2.1.2: Promote appointment of focal points for Human Rights and Gender who will contribute to integrating human rights and IHL in the planning and conduct of operations.	Number of focal points appointed
			1.2.1.4: Strengthen operation of the human rights desk in the operational areas.	Number of human rights desks
			1.2.1.5: Support CSOs to improve access to justice for local communities in the target areas in respect of human rights, sexual and gender-based violence, etc.	Number of CSOs supported; Quality/quantity of resources provided to justice program activities.
			1.2.1.6: Provide training to formal and transitional justice arrangements to receive and manage cases in regard to human rights, sexual and gender-based violence, etc.	Number of trainings provided. Number of formal and transitional justice arrangements
			1.2.1.7: Internal and external mechanisms for recognition and enforcement of practice against code of conduct agreed and adopted.	Number of mechanisms agreed and adopted
			<b>1.2.2: Training of Security Personnel</b>	1.2.2.1: Assess capacities and undertake gaps analysis of pre-deployment training and refresher programmes on human rights, international humanitarian law and civilian protection, sexual and gender-based violence for personnel of all security agencies.
		1.2.2.2: Support updating of training curricula according to accepted recommendations of gap analysis.		Number of training curricula updated
		1.2.2.3: Provide additional training on human rights, IHL and civilian protection, SGBV for personnel to be deployed in target areas of the Facility as needed.		Number of additional trainings provided
		1.2.2.4: Provide training of focal points for Human Rights and Gender to serve in target areas of the Facility.		Number of focal points in target areas
		<b>1.2.3: Development of Manuals and Procedures for Accountability</b>	1.2.3.1: Develop tools and manuals for security agencies, law enforcement officials and other practitioners on the implementation of international standards (Cameron and Nigeria only).	Number of tools and manuals developed for implementation of international standards
			1.2.3.2: Disseminate tools and manuals to all units in target areas, including rules of engagement and codes of conduct to all serving personnel.	Number of tools and manuals disseminated; Number of units in target area
			1.2.3.3: Establish procedures for After-Action Reviews to identify best practices and lessons-learned related to human rights and address the consequences of the operations on the population, including by adapting the modus operandi.	Number of After-Action Reviews conducted; Number of best practices and lessons-learned identified
			1.2.3.4: Public participation as applicable ensured in processes of procedure re/design	Number of government and civil society representatives involved

<b>OUTPUTS</b>	<b>Output 2.1: Human Rights are better respected and Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies are accountable for this</b>	<b>2.1.1: Conflict Sensitivity Analysis &amp; Baseline Surveys</b>	2.1.1.1: Undertake Local Conflict Analyses of target areas	Number of Local Conflict Analyses
			2.1.1.2: Organize baseline surveys of human rights situation in each target area in coordination with National Human Rights Institutions and UNOHCHR	Number of baseline surveys org
		<b>2.1.2: Human Rights Monitoring in Target Areas</b>	2.1.2.1: Establish methodology and reporting requirements for monitoring regime in close coordination with UNOHCHR	Effective monitoring regime in p
			2.1.2.2: Identify and partner with relevant national human rights organizations & develop capacities for monitoring operations.	Number of human rights organi; Number of partnerships establis
			2.1.2.3: Undertake regular monitoring missions to target areas.	Number of monitoring missions undertaken.
		<b>2.1.3: Human Rights Reporting</b>	2.1.3.1: Produce quarterly Human Rights monitoring reports for all target areas for review by UNOHCHR, Partner Platforms and LCBC	Number of quarterly Human Rig reports produced.

<b>OUTPUTS</b>	<b>Output 2.2:</b> Local populations have regained trust in Security Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies	<b>2.2.1:</b> Stabilisation Committees established in each target area	2.2.1.1: Conduct Community Perception Studies on Security in target areas	Number of Community Perception Studies conducted.
			2.2.1.2: Establish inclusive and participatory Stabilisation Committees in each target area, building on perception studies and conflict analyses.	Number of Stabilisation Committees established.
			2.2.1.3: Facilitate development of Public Safety and Security plans by each Stabilisation Committee	Number of Public Safety and Security Plans developed by each Stabilisation Committee.
			2.2.1.4: Capacity development of Stabilisation Committees for early warning and response.	Number of Stabilisation Committees that deliver a set of early warning response instruments.
		<b>2.2.2:</b> Community Engagement on Security	2.2.2.1: Community workshops on mandate of security providers, to be organised by Agency Focal Points	Number of community workshops organised. Number of individuals reached/involved.
			2.2.2.2: Community workshops on Human Rights and procedures for reporting Human Rights violations	Number of community workshops on Human Rights organised. Number of Human Rights violations reported and referred to competent authorities.
			2.2.2.3: Disseminate and validate Stabilisation Committee Public Safety and Security Plans with wider community in each target area.	Number of Stabilisation Committees and Security Plans disseminated.
			2.2.2.4: Mechanisms for public complaints handling designed and piloted in target areas of each country.	Number of mechanisms designed and piloted.
		<b>2.2.3:</b> Responding to Community-identified Security Priorities	2.2.3.1: Design and implement sub-projects to respond to community-identified needs of the Public Safety and Security Plans	Number of sub-projects designed and implemented.
			2.2.3.2: Organise representation/involvement of security providers in sub-project implementation, and participatory approach to monitoring and evaluation of sub-project implementation.	Number of security providers involved in sub-project implementation.
			2.2.3.3: Conduct repeat Community Perception Studies on Security at end of intervention to assess impact and change in relations between population and security providers.	Number of repeat Community Perception Studies conducted at the end of intervention.

## 2.6 Project Partnerships

The Project will work with and through the National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) that exist in each country, with whom UN/UNDP is already engaged. It is envisaged that they will play a multi-faceted and critical role in regard to human rights monitoring, training and potentially implementation of training, and as a bridge between Governments and civil society. UNDP will provide NHRIs with operational means and capacity development support to work with human rights defenders at local level undertake initial human rights assessments in the target areas to be selected as well as to conduct and report upon regular monitoring missions throughout the duration of the Project.

The project will work with the African Police Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF) to strengthen external oversight of police and other security advisers under Output 1.2, as per previous UNDP partnership in Somalia, Kenya and Sierra Leone, with and through the UNDP Global Focal Point on police, justice and corrections:

<https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/rule-of-law-justice-and-security/global-focal-point-for-police-justice-and-corrections/>

This will allow the Project to access UNPOL officers for up to 6 months without cost, through UN DPKO Standing Police Capacity.

The Facility will collaborate and coordinate with the UN OHCHR regionally and in each country to backstop NHRIs, ensure transparency in recording and reporting of incidents, and appropriate follow-up to allegations of human rights violations.

The project will also work with NANHRI (the Network of African National Human Rights Institutions) at regional level to develop capacities of LCBC for human rights advocacy and promotion, in support of implementation of pillar 2 of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy, Security and Human Rights<sup>16</sup>.

## 2.7 Sustainability

The UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility has been designed as an engine to promote national and regional ownership, and as a partnership instrument to aid resolution of the crisis through support to local, national and regional capacities and action.

Sustainability will be assured through a capacity development approach. National capacities at all levels – central, State/Region, LGA/Commune – will be supported to extend Government presence into currently inaccessible or insecure areas, to secure the peace and rebuild the social contract between the local population and the State, and to initiate a transition from humanitarian assistance to development and resilience.

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<sup>16</sup> NANHRI is the regional partner of GANHRI (the Global alliance of National Human Rights Institutions). UNDP works in a tripartite partnership on Human Rights with GANHRI and UN OHCHR.



Support to implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy is intended to further cement regional ownership of a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated framework for multi-party intervention.

Environmental sustainability is a key concern of the Facility and mainstreamed within its design. Climate change fragility assessments will inform Joint Action Plans for all target areas, along with specific plans for harnessing renewable energy to provide light and power to communities.

## 2.8 Project Leveraging Effect

The UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility will target relatively insecure areas where early recovery efforts are currently either absent or require further support to gain traction. The Community Safety and Security component of the Facility – to which the Project herein will contribute – should establish the freedom of movement and other conditions necessary to attract further investments to the selected target areas.

An improved human rights situation in the region should reassure international partners and secure additional bilateral assistance on security as well as further support to the multilateral, multi-donor Regional Stabilisation Facility.

The Facility is intended as an intervention that is likely to have multiple, overlapping phases, given the scale of the territory that remains vulnerable to incursion and attack by armed opposition groups and the scope of the security-humanitarian-development challenge. The intention of the Facility is to achieve ‘proof of concept’ under a first phase of two-year duration, and to seek further resources from Governments, international partners and the private sector on an on-going basis.

## 3. Implementation Arrangements

### 3.1 Status, Duration and Phases

The Project is a multi-donor action between the European Union and UNDP, to be implemented within the framework of the UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility for Lake Chad. The Project work plan and budget foresee an implementation period of 24 months. The total cost of the Action is estimated at USD 11,028,999.32 and the EU will provide a contribution up to a maximum of EUR 5,000,000.

The project will begin with a three-month Inception Phase, in which UNDP will prepare a detailed first year work plan for approval by the EU. The Inception Phase will be utilised to recruit staff and establish the field offices, and to undertake, *inter alia*, the following key activities:

- i) Complete preparation of JAPs including local conflict analyses and community perception studies on security in target areas, and further define indicators and targets for monitoring and evaluation purposes;
- ii) Definition of target area capacity gaps of relevant law enforcement Agencies (personnel, infrastructure, equipment, training)
- iii) Establish of ad/hoc Security Planning Groups (SPGs) for each State/Region
- iv) Agree coordination arrangements on security for each specific target

- v) Assessment of security providers according to the UN Human Rights Due Diligence (HRDD) framework;
- vi) Establishment of liaison and coordination arrangements with relevant EU Projects with and through national EU Delegations;
- vii) Partnership agreements with National Human Rights Institutions and CSOs to undertake Human Rights Baseline surveys in the target areas;
- viii) Assessment of legal frameworks, codes of conduct, SOPs etc., gaps analysis and recommendations
- ix) Undertake Local Conflict Analyses of target areas
- x) Organise baseline surveys of human rights situation in each target area in coordination with National Human Rights Institutions and UNOHCHR
- xi) Establish methodology and reporting requirements for monitoring regime in close coordination with UNOHCHR

Outputs relating to each of these activities will be annexed to an Inception Phase report for EU Delegation review and approval. According to the content of the Inception Phase report, an amendment to the contract might be considered.

The Implementation Phase of the Project will commence at the beginning of Month 4 of the Project and conclude at the end of Month 24.

### 3.2 Coordination Arrangements

The Project will be fully coordinated with other relevant national and international programmes in the target areas and at national level, to maximise synergy between interventions and to avoid overlap or duplication.

The Project will be integrated substantively and operationally in the implementation of the broader UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility, which itself will be fully integrated and coordinated with the overall UNDP portfolio of response interventions in the Boko Haram-affected areas of the four countries.

During the Inception Phase of the Project, UNDP will continue liaising with DEVCO and meeting with EU Delegations in each country to establish liaison and coordination arrangements between the Project and relevant ongoing and planned EU interventions; building on the list provided in the EU Action Fiche for the Project herein.

The overarching UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility (RSF) envisages support to thematic and territorial coordination of implementation of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy (RSS) in each country, at both national and State/Region level.

An International Strategy Task Force, building upon membership of UN Agency working groups for implementation of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, will be established at regional level and with national chapters in each country. The Task Force will establish a common regional results framework and indicators for each pillar of the Strategy, including Pillar 2 for Security and Human Rights.

The UNDP RSF will also support enhanced sectoral and territorial coordination by State/Region authorities in the eight Boko Haram-affected areas covered by the LCBC RSS.

### 3.3 Communications & Visibility Plan

UNDP is committed to ensuring EU visibility to the highest possible standard, fully compliant with the Joint Visibility Guidelines agreed for use between the European Commission and United Nations Agencies operating under the Financial & Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) of May 2003.

While UNDP will promote EU visibility in regard to the Project with Governments, regional institutions and the international community, it should be noted that the Facility has a policy of *no local-level visibility for donors or for UNDP as implementing agency*. All results achieved will be branded as the result of local and national Government activity, to ensure that credit accrues to the State, and supports renewal of the social contract between the State and local communities. Results achieved will be publicised beyond the immediate target areas of the Facility, as a counter-narrative to the propaganda of armed opposition groups and will be articulated to each national chapter of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy strategic communications plan.

An outline EU Communications and Visibility Plan is attached to this document. The visibility strategy and work plan will be further detailed during the Inception Phase of the Project and submitted to the EU as an Annex to the Inception Phase Report for approval.

### 3.4 Management, Staffing and Offices

The Project will be implemented as part of the UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility for Lake Chad, with national management teams in each country and regional project assurance and reporting conducted by the UNDP Regional Service Centre based in Addis Ababa.

The Project herein will contribute 50% of the gross personnel costs for the international Head of Stabilisation (P5) in each country, who will oversee a Project team responsible for activity implementation, monitoring, and reporting. Each dedicated Project team will comprise an International UN Volunteer (IUNV) with a background in Human Rights, a Finance/Admin Assistant and a Driver. In Nigeria, given the complexity of the situation and the scale of the territory to be covered, the national team will be augmented by an International Human Rights Advisor (P3).

In order to reduce costs to the project, engineering staff, procurement specialists and finance/admin staff will be charged to relevant budget lines according to timesheets of hours/days worked.

Staffing of the Regional Service Centre for Africa, based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, will include a consultant responsible for project assurance, technical coordination and consolidated reporting, and the cost of a Finance/Admin Assistant responsible for financial reporting.

Project teams will be co-located with other UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility staff in offices in Maiduguri, Nigeria; Diffa, Niger; Bol, Chad; Maroua, Cameroon. The Project will fund one vehicle per Project team, with radio communications, as well as office furniture and equipment for use by Project staff. The Project will contribute toward Facility office running costs in each location, maintenance and fuel costs for the Project vehicle, and other UNDP Direct Costs as indicated in the Project budget, in Annex to this Description of the Action.

## 3.5 Risk Analysis & Management

The overall risk level of the Facility is deemed to be medium to high, and a certain risk tolerance is required of all partners. The work will be undertaken in the midst of an active conflict zone, in areas with little initial Government presence.

Stabilisation can contribute to improved security but the insurgency, irrespective of the success of the stabilisation interventions (or even due to the success of the interventions), will continue to pose a significant threat to the sustainability of the interventions. This risk must be accepted by all stakeholders involved in the Stabilisation Facility.

UNDP will actively work to continuously monitor, update and mitigate risks that fall under the following categories:

- Security risks;
- Political risks;
- Operational risks; and
- Reputational risks.

Also, upon launch of the Facility and prior to implementation of activities, a full Risk Analysis will be commissioned and form basis for all further risk identification, mitigation and management. The analysis will look into all potential risks, including social, environmental and climate-related risks as well as those unidentified at the stage of developing the initial project document.

The results of the analysis will be shared with the four national Partner Platforms and with the Regional Technical Coordination Committee for discussion and approval. The Risk analysis will update Annex 4, categorising the nature of all risks, probability and likely impact, proposed mitigation measures and responsibility for their implementation.

Facility management will report on risk to Partner Platforms on a quarterly basis and will update national 'window' risk logs accordingly. Partner Platforms will have the responsibility to manage risk at national levels, and to take action when and if risks materialise; for the regional level, or where the materialisation of risk requires budgets to be diverted from one RSF 'window' to another, the Regional Technical Coordination Committee will have responsibility for doing so.

### 3.5.1 Security risks

The Facility will specifically target areas vulnerable to continued infiltration and attacks, and it is possible – perhaps likely – that successful intervention may attract spoiler attacks by armed opposition groups. Output 1 of the Facility is designed to strengthen community security in mitigation.

Civil-military cooperation and improved coordination of security providers is key for improved physical security of project personnel and community members alike and is at the heart of the Facility methodology. Liaising closely with military forces from each Government concerned will help keep target areas secure while the transition to civilian law enforcement and community-organised security arrangements is undertaken. Building capacities of community security providers and supporting the establishment of community-based security systems (e.g. for early warning) for each target area is essential for limiting security risks. Physical risk can also be mitigated by fielding national third-party contractors, most of whom are resident in or near the target areas which may be off-limits to UN staff.

Negotiations with formal and informal authorities and community leaders will also be held to secure a safe environment for Facility staff and implementing partners.

UNDP will implement the Facility under the guidance of the UN Department for Safety and Security and the authority of the UN Designated Security Official in each of the respective countries.

### 3.5.2 Political risks

The key political risk to successful implementation of the programme will be insufficient buy-in of key stakeholders. Major players may have divergent views and back different objectives. Stabilisation assistance can also be misused by government authorities or traditional leaders for political ends, or to side-line or isolate other parties or actors that are part of the peace process. Replacement of local or national government leaders, or the inability of local governments to function due to political transition, constitutes another political risk. If the authority of a central government or transitional authority remains in question, or when there are major divisions in the military, security and political support for Strategy implementation is not guaranteed. If the political dimension of stabilisation is perceived as largely guided by representatives of the international community, securing public support can be jeopardised. Lack of trust in leadership and political institutions, and the subsequent lack of interest of citizens to participate in political life, constitutes another political risk to successful implementation of the Strategy.

The risk of insufficient buy-in can be offset by the high degree of regional and national ownership of the LCBC Stabilisation Strategy and can be further mitigated through a process of extensive consultations at local, state and national level in the four countries, to ensure that all perspectives and interests are aligned as far as possible. In addition, it is expected that the Partner Platforms, the LCBC and AUC will continue to promote political buy-in at national level. Political advocacy, and extensive consultations at local, state, national and regional level in the four countries will help ensure that all perspectives are aligned as much as possible. Ensuring that all stakeholders are fully involved at the inception of the project and all beneficiaries involved as partners to decision-making re-design and implementation of the Facility will secure their ongoing interest and participation. Participation of the community in monitoring results is equally important. The risk of local government turnover can be mitigated by identifying and aligning with key community members who can support and promote ongoing community participation in the implementation process.

### 3.5.3 Operational risks

Insufficient capacity of UNDP to support stabilisation efforts constitutes the key operational risk. Attracting staff with relevant skill sets (strategic communication, HR, procurement, finance, quality assurance, reporting, management, etc.) to work in remote and insecure areas may prove difficult but can be mitigated in the first instance through utilisation of the UNDP crisis response system for rapid deployment of experienced personnel.

Other risks include the availability of sufficient well-qualified contractors and NGOs able to operate in remote areas, to be offset by prequalification exercises at the launch of the Facility; speed of procurement, recruitment, and payment mechanisms, to be mitigated through establishment of dedicated Facility Service Centres in each country (see Section 4.2); appropriateness of community engagement modalities will be assured through rapid conflict analysis of the target area and participatory dialogue with community Peace Committees.

Slow implementation of the Strategy by the AUC and LCBC constitutes another operational risk that may hamper immediate stabilisation. Building the substantive and operational capacities of the LCBC Stabilisation Secretariat under Output 4 will mitigate the risk involved.

#### 3.5.4 Reputational risks

Reputational risks include associations (real or perceived) with parties of the conflict, political actors, rights violators, and need to be managed through local conflict analyses, wide stakeholder engagement, communication, and coordination with human rights and political arms of the UN system. In addition, regular transparent communication of project activities to all stakeholders as well as regular consultation with counterparts in the four countries will help in mitigating this risk.

Human rights due diligence (HRDD) will constitute an essential component of UNDP's risk management protocol. Assessing actual and potential human rights issues, acting on the findings, tracking responses, and communicating about how impacts may be addressed is essential for limiting reputational risk. The envisaged provision of support to human right defenders in monitoring, investigation and reporting on abuses, along with systematic vetting of potential local partners (individuals, companies and civil society organisations) that UNDP plans to work with, will also help mitigate reputational risk.

In addition, regular consultation with counterparts and regular transparent communication of project activities to all stakeholders involved will help mitigate reputational risk. All stakeholders (the donors, other agencies, and communities themselves) should be kept fully informed about the nature and level of risk involved. In addition to communicating intentions and achievements, controlling the narrative is also an essential component in the management of reputational risk.

*A Risk Analysis and Risk Management Table appears overleaf*

## Risk Analysis and Risk Management

	Risks/Externalities	Risk category	Impact & Probability	Mitigation measures
1	A lack of RSF financial resources	Financial	Medium to High	<p>Ensure consistent donor participation in regional Partner Platforms.</p> <p>Establish accountable, transparent and communication documents and</p> <p>Selection of total number of target areas based on available resources, allowing a combination of support for each target area.</p>
2	Currency devaluation, financial crises	Financial (external)	Medium & Low	<p>Ensure regular risk identification.</p> <p>Ensure that risk assessment forms are approved by the national and regional Facility Boards.</p>
3	Misappropriation or misuse of resources	Financial/Operational	Medium/High	<p>International organisation to have sufficient staff and resources to ensure efficient management at the local level. Careful selection of sub-contractors.</p> <p>Appropriate financial and technical support to any sub-contracted local organisations.</p> <p>selection of community representatives.</p>
4	A lack of coordination between National, State / Regional and Local Authorities in the 4 countries	Political	Medium & High	<p>Activities in target areas initiate where mechanisms have been agreed to a</p>
5	Internal bottlenecks (procurement, payments, logistics, speed of implementation)	Operational	High & Low	<p>Establishment of RSF-exclusive Service Providers in 4 countries.</p> <p>Advance planning of procurement areas of implementation modalities on the prepositioning of vendors and key</p> <p>Use of established and tested implementation approaches in target areas.</p>

				<p>Use of UNDP staff and external rosters to fill the vacant positions, particular in the countries.</p> <p>Engaging PSU early on to enable co-ordination with relevant colleagues from other COs to learn and tap into existing LTAs (for services), etc. and best practice team solutions.</p>
6	Lack of access due to insecurity (incl. consequences of mitigation of security risks)	Safety and Security; Operational	High & Medium	<p>Timely identification of risks associated through engagement of a dedicated team.</p> <p>Regular negotiations with military, local authorities and community leaders to create a conducive environment for implementing partners themselves.</p> <p>Work with implementing partners with presence.</p> <p>Close coordination and communication with partners.</p> <p>Adding security measures to increase resilience (procuring armoured vehicles for reconstruction, building adequate local security cost of each of the RSF country 'windows').</p>
7	Terrorism - Asymmetric attacks by Armed Opposition Groups	Safety and Security	Medium to Very High	<p>Effective security coordination with local authorities, MNTF and other security forces. Appropriate, UNDSS/UNDP security measures effective in formation sharing on both emerging threats. Provision of security protective equipment in accordance with requirements.</p>



8	Armed Conflict - Collateral damage during counterterrorist military operations, armed clashes	Safety and Security	Medium to High	Effective security coordination with f authorities, MNTF and other security appropriate. UNDSS/UNDP security effective information sharing on both emerging threats. Provision of secur protective equipment in accordance
9	Terrorism/Crime - Abduction of UN personnel or implementing partners/TP contractors	Safety and Security	Medium to High	Medium threat to UN as mitigation n place however significant risk to imp third party contractors working on th
10	Destruction and/or theft of UN assets and third party contractor assets	Safety and Security	Medium to High	Effective security coordination with f authorities, MNTF and other security appropriate. The engagement of loc. companies/ community provided sec company. Appropriate mitigation me protect assets.
11	Perceived association of project with parties of the conflict, political actors, rights violators	Reputational	Medium & Medium	Wide stakeholder engagement, com coordination with human rights and UN system. Ensure regular and clear communic and Facility objectives to all stakeho
12	Lack of interest of the local stakeholders/communities	Political	High & Medium	Assure that all stakeholders are fully inception of the project and involve a partners to decision-making re desig implementation of the Facility.
13	Insufficient buy-in of or blockage by key National, State / Regional and Local stakeholders in the four countries.	Political	High & Medium	Political advocacy, and extensive co state, national and regional level in t ensure that all perspectives are as n aligned. Set up a continuous Partner Platform national authorities, UNDP senior m international partners. Ensure community participation in d monitoring.

14	Continued attacks by armed opposition groups	Safety & Security	High & High	Work with religious leaders to promote faith dialogue and inclusivity among members, as well as to suppress violence.
				Ensure that community resilience mechanisms, early warning systems, and enhance security measures and structures are in place.
				Ensure close civil – military coordination in high-risk areas.
15	Proliferation and trafficking of weapons	Safety & Security	High & High	Serial numbers of weapons will be recorded to prevent theft or future misuse. Support will be provided for stockpile management and DDR mechanisms.
16	Political situation/turnover of government	Political	Medium & Medium	Identify key community members who can promote community participation/mechanisms in the event that local or national leaders are replaced or that local government is unable to function due to political transitions.
17	Human rights violations by national and local security forces reduce trust in the Government	Reputational	High & Medium	Provide support to human rights defenders for monitoring, investigation and reporting.
				Systematic vetting of potential local actors.

18	The project might generate some waste during the infrastructure works	Environmental	Low & Medium	All construction works will be carried out with appropriate waste-management regulations. The contractors to be selected will be required to ensure waste generated by the project is disposed of in a manner that is in line with international regulations of construction waste management. While primary-level supervision will be conducted by local authorities, secondary-level supervision will be conducted directly by UNDP Engineers (wherever the situation allows access for UN staff) to ensure that the rules and regulations on waste management are complied with.
20	Insufficient capacity of rights-holders to claim their rights	Social/human rights	Medium & Moderate	The Facility will support human rights reporting in the target areas, as part of its efforts to promote accountability and compliance with international and continental norms. It will also nurture relations of trust and confidence with security providers and local communities (1.8).
21	Discriminations against women and marginalized persons could be potentially reproduced	Social/human rights	Medium & Moderate	Upon launch of the Facility and prior to the start of activities, a full Risk Analysis will be conducted. The analysis will look into all potential social, environmental and climate-related risks, including those unidentified at the stage of initial project document.

### 3.6 Governance Arrangements

Project governance arrangements will conform to those of the UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility as a whole.

The four national 'windows' of the Regional Stabilisation Facility – including all activities of the Project herein – will be governed by national Partner Platforms (referred to as Project Boards in UNDP's rules and regulations). The Partner Platforms will review the strategic direction of each national window on an annual or as-needed basis, ensuring accountability and proper oversight of project management and have ultimate decision-making authority.

The Head of Stabilisation in each country will provide regular updates to the Partner Platform on a quarterly basis, including updates on risk analysis and management. If required, especially for any important risk related reviews, ad-hoc meetings will be organized to discuss risk levels and mitigating measures.

Bi-annual meetings will be held to establish and/or review progress toward Annual Work Plans. This will entail setting and revising deliverables and achievement of benchmarks, alongside opportunities for fine-tuning and adjustments, including any prioritisation of activities. To ensure UNDP's ultimate accountability, Partner Platform decisions should be made in accordance with corporate UNDP standards that shall ensure best value to money, fairness, integrity, transparency and effective accountability.

The Partner Platforms will be co-chaired by a national Government representative and the UN Resident Representative and, to the extent possible, will be light operational structures ensuring speedy and efficient decision making. Each Partner Platform will comprise the following roles and functions:

- **The Executive** - The role of the Executive will be held by the UNDP National Head of Stabilisation, or Regional Stabilisation Coordinator. The Executive is ultimately responsible for the project, assisted by the Senior Beneficiary and Senior Supplier. The Executive's role is to ensure that the project is focused throughout its life cycle on achieving its expected results and delivering outputs that will contribute to longer-term impact. The Executive should ensure that the project gives value for money, ensuring a cost-conscious approach to the project, balancing the demands of beneficiary and supplier.
- **The Senior Beneficiary** - Representatives of the participating Governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria will jointly the role of Senior Beneficiary respectively in each Project Board. The Senior Beneficiary is responsible for validating the needs and for monitoring that the solution will meet those needs within the lifecycle of the project. The role represents the interests of all those who will benefit from the project. The Senior Beneficiary role monitors progress against targets and quality criteria.
- **Senior Supplier** - Donor partners, LCBC and the AUC, and the UN Resident Coordinator's Office in each country will hold the role of Senior Supplier. The Senior Supplier represents the interests of the parties which provide funding and/or technical expertise to the project (designing, developing, facilitating, procuring, implementing). The Senior Supplier's primary function within the Board is to provide guidance regarding the technical feasibility of the

project. The Senior Supplier role must have the authority to commit or acquire supplier resources as required.

- **Quality Assurance** - The Quality Assurance role supports the Executive Board and is assumed by the UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa for all Project Boards (Partner Platforms), which will undertake objective and independent oversight and monitoring functions on behalf of each Board. This role ensures that appropriate programme management milestones are managed and completed.

A Regional Technical Coordination Committee has been established as a sub-committee of the LCBC Regional Stabilisation Strategy Steering (RSS) Committee.

The Regional Technical Coordination Committee is chaired by LCBC. Members include the African Union support team for the Regional Stabilisation Strategy, donor partners to the Facility (including the EU for the Project described herein), the four Resident Representatives, one of the UN Resident Coordinators from the affected countries on a rotating basis, and the UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa (RSCA). UNDP Country Offices implementing national windows will participate on as-needed basis to report to the Committee.

The Regional Technical Coordination Committee will review and integrate national window Annual Work Plans into a coherent overarching work plan for the region, undertake risk review and advise on risk management. UNDP will commission and present a detailed risk analysis and management paper in regard to the work of the Facility, for review by the first meeting of the Regional Technical Coordination Committee.

### 3.7 Monitoring and Reporting

UNDP will establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and prepare regular narrative progress reports. Each report will provide an accurate account of the implementation of the Facility, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results as measured by the corresponding indicators, using the indicative logical framework as a reference. The final reports, financial and descriptive, will cover the entire period of the implementation of the action.

An **Inception Phase Report (IPR)** will be submitted to the EU for approval at the end of the Inception Phase. The IPR will update activities to be undertaken based upon RSF preparation of Joint Action Plans for the target areas and will include a revised logical framework matrix with baseline data and success indicators. The risk log for the project will also be updated and a detailed budget breakdown submitted per activity.

**Interim narrative reports** will be submitted in line with the financial reporting requirements determined by the payment schedule of the contract with the European Commission.

The **Final Report** will be submitted to the EU Delegation within six months of the end of Programme implementation.

Other than the Inception Phase Report, each report will consist of a narrative section and a financial section. The format and detail required of these reports will comply with the Joint Guidelines on Reporting under the Framework Administrative & Financial Agreement (FAFA) between the European Commission and UN Agencies.

UNDP will also report on a number of common EUTF indicators of the selected results for this Action.

### 3.8 Project Assurance, Evaluation and Audit

The project assurance function will be the responsibility of the UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa, which will carry out periodic internal monitoring missions to assess progress toward the desired results and make recommendations for adjustments as deemed necessary.

For problem solving and learning purposes, a mid-term evaluation will be carried out for the Facility via independent consultants contracted by UNDP in month 15 after Facility launch. The mid-term evaluation report will be shared with the Government authorities and donor partners. The Partner Platform will analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the Facility.

A final evaluation will be conducted in Month 24 of the Project, to inform preparation and implementation of a second phase of the UNDP Regional Stabilisation Facility.

The Project will be subject to the internal and external auditing procedures provided for in the financial regulations, rules and directives of the UNDP.

The audit of UNDP activities is carried out by external and/or internal auditors:

- External audit: fulfilled by the United Nations Board of Auditors (BoA); and
- Internal audit: assigned to the Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI).

All externally available information on accountability of UNDP, including disclosure of audit reports can be found at:

<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/accountability/overview.html>

In accordance with Executive Board decision 2012/18 of June 2012, all audit reports issued by UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI) since 1 December 2012 are publicly disclosed on this website, one month after they have been issued internally.

If necessary, expenditure verification assignments could be contracted by the European Commission for one or several contracts or agreements. Expenditure verification assignments will be carried out in conformity with the risk analysis in the frame of the yearly exercise conducted by the European Commission.

### 3.3 Work Plan & Budget Notes

A detailed UNDP Annual Work Plan will be prepared during the Inception Phase of the Project, which will coincide with preparation of the Joint Action Plans for the target areas of the Facility, for approval by the European Union.

The proposed budget for the Programme accompanies this Description of the Action as Annex III of the overall contract.

The budget will be further revised, disaggregated by country, and detailed during the Inception Phase, and a contract addendum request will be submitted to the EU with the Inception Phase Report if required.

## Annex 1: Key Activities for Nigeria

For Nigeria, the below table details key activities to be undertaken, beneficiary numbers, disaggregated where possible, and the numbers of police present (if at all):

<p><b><u>Banki</u></b> Population: 42,141 (23,529 women)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Construction of a Police Post in Banki Military Perimeter</li> <li>- Rehabilitation of police station and accommodation</li> <li>- Capacity building of law enforcement agencies on HRBA</li> <li>- Establishment of community based reconciliation and peacebuilding platforms and strengthening of stabilisation committees</li> </ul> <p><i>No Police Presence at the current time. These will be introduced as infrastructure is put in place.</i></p>
<p><b><u>Buni Yadi</u></b> Population: 50,000 estimate  Police: 35</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rehabilitation of Buni Yadi Police Station</li> <li>- Capacity building for local leadership and security system including establishment/strengthening of community security mechanisms</li> <li>- Engagement with service provider to support referrals, legal information, legal advice, monitoring of disputes/HR issues in community, monitoring of police stations etc.</li> <li>- Establishment of community platform for women to facilitate dialogue</li> </ul> <p><i>Police Divisional HQ is present and operational with 35 Police stationed in the town.</i></p>
<p><b><u>Damboa</u></b> Population: 300,000 estimate (this includes persons in the LGA who will be able to access Damboa and be beneficiaries) Within Damboa town there are 78,982 women, 63,823. 81,785 are youth Police: 60 (within town) and 156 with the area command</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rehabilitation and expansion of police station &amp; residence</li> <li>- Capacity building of security forces with a focus on hrba SGBV issues (inc. community policing)</li> <li>- Facilitate establishment of stabilisation and community-based reconciliation platforms</li> </ul> <p><i>Police including mobile Police are present with a strength of 60 whereas the area command is present with a strength of 156.</i></p>
<p><b><u>Gulak</u></b> Population: 26,000 14,000 women, 12,000 men est  Police: 35 est</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rehabilitation of Gulak Police Station and Police Barracks</li> <li>- Capacity building of security actors and local leadership including strengthening of stabilisation committees</li> <li>- Facilitate strengthening of community platforms on peacebuilding</li> </ul> <p><i>Police are present in the town with the divisional HQ present.</i></p>



<p><b><u>Kanama</u></b> Population: 2,000 women, 1,000 men of which 1,000 youth</p> <p>No police presence: once post is completed estimated numbers will be approx. 5</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rehabilitation of police station and barracks</li> <li>- Support training of security actors on HRBA, SGBV (inc. community policing)</li> <li>- Local services provider to support establishment of legal info, referral services and mediation services</li> <li>- Establishment of community platform for women to facilitate dialogue</li> </ul> <p><i>No Police are present currently. Their return will be negotiated as part of the rehabilitation of infrastructure</i></p>
<p><b><u>Monguno</u></b> Population: 219,862 est (this includes persons in the LGA who will be able to access Damboa and be beneficiaries). Within the town itself there are 46,172 women, 37,826 men of which 64,508 are youth Police 35</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rehabilitation of police residence/barracks</li> <li>- Support training of security actors on HRBA, SGBV (inc. community policing)</li> <li>- Stabilisation committees established and trained</li> <li>- Local services provider to support establishment of legal info, referral services and mediation services</li> </ul> <p><i>There are 35 Police present</i></p>
<p><b><u>Ngarannam</u></b> Est: 3,000 (these are the IDP's) as community is destroyed</p> <p>No police presence: once post is completed estimated numbers will be approx. 5</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Construction of police post (supported by main police station in Mafa which is adjacent)</li> <li>- Capacity development of security actors on HRBA, SGBV (inc. community policing)</li> <li>- Establish and operationalize stabilisation committees</li> </ul> <p><i>Police presence is in MAFA Town. A presence will be established in the community</i></p>

Where Police are not present, numbers to be deployed and trained will be agreed with the State Police. In the remainder of cases, the JAPS outline the number of Police already deployed and the project will support strengthening of their capacities on site through mentoring and on the job training and support.

No material support will be provided to military forces in any country by the project, beyond training in international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights, and gender issues. Similar training and material support will be provided to civilian law enforcement agencies and selected vigilante groups which are recognised by Government, integrated into regular security architecture, and subject to oversight and accountability processes.

The Regional Stabilisation Facility will implement the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) and ensure proper mitigation mechanisms to identified human rights related risks, ensuring, among others, that implementation does not in any way legitimise institutions or leaders that have been associated with egregious violations of human rights. The HRDDP framework will be used to assess national security actors prior to engagement, establishing the concrete involvement of local human rights actors and actions necessary to build their capacities.

